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Until fairly recently, understanding early modern Southeast Asian history depended almost 
entirely on European travel accounts, documents in European archives, and on the main 
chronicles of indigenous courts. Changes in the field, especially the stretched boundaries of 
viable historical projects afforded by interdisciplinary cooperation, have considerably broadened 
our perspectives on the period and the place. These changes have also opened up a new research 
space for asking questions about intercultural exchange. Certainly, our richer understanding of 
the period allows us to revisit older understandings of the centrality of the throne and central 
religious organizations, whether European or indigenous, to political and religious developments 
in the region. We are also enabled to better contextualise the documents in the state archives, 
missionary letters, and royal chronicles and to discern more clearly and, in some geographical 
areas, for the first time, a greater significance of ‘the periphery’ in the processes of intercultural 
exchange formerly isolated to the court, the port, and the battlefield. Nevertheless, we remain 
under the shadow of the cultural brokers who shapeshifted their identities in manoeuvring the 
contours of overlapping peripheries. Locating their role in the interplay of culture, religion, and 
politics is hampered for the same reasons that made them so successful, for a time, in Western 
mainland Southeast Asia. So long as the major political and religious institutions of early modern 
Southeast Asia remained independent of each other, the Portuguese and the indigenous courts, 
on the one hand, and the Catholic Church and the Buddhist monastic orders (to take one 
indigenous example), on the other, playing a multiplicity of roles was both a necessity and an 
advantage.  
The periphery as a zone of interaction was previously considered secondary to the stories 
of both Portuguese and indigenous political expansion. The Portuguese communities rose and 
fell with the fortunes of the Estado da India and in their autonomy grew stronger with the decline 
of indigenous states. The decline in discipline of Buddhist monastics on the frontiers likewise 
would reflect the decline of the Buddhist king and his court and hearken the forthcoming 
collapse of the kingdom and another cycle of political regeneration and purification of the 
Religion. In this view, this zone was not one of exchange but of alienation, the space at the 
furthest reach from anything else and attention was focused instead on the points at which the 
contact was most obvious—in the royal centre, where Southeast Asians and Portuguese came 
into more visible and often official contact. In actuality, the periphery played a primary role in 
intercultural exchange. The Portuguese renegade communities were often the only bridge 
between Europeans and indigenous populations in Western mainland Southeast Asia and their 
presence made the periphery central to intercultural exchange.  
 The dissipation of influence and control exercised by political centres with greater 
distance from the political centre – geographically and socially – has long been an accepted trope 
of Southeast Asian historiography. The emergence and influence of nationalist historiography in 
the last half of the twentieth century, however, has obstructed efforts to understand how 
peripherality impacted local religious and cultural dynamism. History, even of periods many 
centuries ago, is anachronistically framed according to contemporary political delineations and 
modern national cultural and religious formations. The necessary reliance on paper archives, 
dominated by the perspectives of political centres, has only made this obstruction more difficult 
to negotiate. For many historians working in these conditions, understanding the history of 
Buddhism in Burma meant focusing on central religious patronage patterns and monastic 
appointments in the royal capital. It has also been difficult to work on the history of Buddhism 
in Burma without accepting, at least overtly, that Burmese were Buddhists as much nine hundred 
years ago as they are today. This is actually untrue at both ends of this time-frame, for few 
Burmese would have been Buddhists in 1100 CE in the way that we understand lay practitioners 
today and many Burmese today are not Buddhists, but Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and so on, 
but many nationalists claim otherwise. Scholarship of the last few decades on borderlands has 
helped to challenge this view. Nevertheless, this scholarship has mainly contributed to the image 
of binary oppositions, associating a different dynamic to the highlands than to lowlands and to 
ethnic minorities as opposed to Burmans. From the perspective of this literature, state space is 
seen as internally uniform and the polar opposite of non-state space.i As a result, this literature is 
just as unsatisfactory in its own way as the older literature that it sought to rectify for 
understanding the limits of the influence of political, cultural, and religious centres in mainland 
Southeast Asia.  
On its fringes, the mainland Southeast Asian Buddhist political centre was more distant, 
desperate, and more tolerant (it hardly had the means to be otherwise) of nonconformity and 
change, although this reality is rarely reflected in the hype of royal orders and state chronicles 
that sought to portray powerful world rulers, not weak central administrators.ii The reach of 
central monastic institutions was also weaker and their influence less entrenched, giving a great 
deal of room for local interests and alternatives until relatively late in the early modern period 
when states even in this part of the world were becoming larger, their administrations more 
efficient, and their ability to garrison and control better. Certainly this was not yet the case prior 
to the late eighteenth century in Burma, especially in the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries. 
Just as our focus has shifted from the centre to the periphery in the case of Buddhist 
kingdoms such as Burma, the status of their geographical points of contact with the Portuguese 
is also being reconsidered. More recent understandings of the Estado da Índia, for example, have 
moved beyond an older view that focused on central institutions to speak for the history of the 
Portuguese presence in Asia, the failures of adventurers on the mainland being seen as examples 
of the poorly considered projects that sought to expand the Estado da Índia. More recent work by 
such scholars as Sanjay Subrahmanyam have decentred the motivations and energies involved in 
these ‘frontier’ projects, stressing  
 
the crucial, and often determining character of local initiatives and private persons, 
inhabitants of geographical, political and social frontier zones, in influencing the 
changing shape of the Estado da Índia. For, if the received wisdom stresses the great 
‘empire builders’ and insists on viewing the Portuguese enterprise in Asia from top 
down, as well as from the centre outwards, there may be some worth noting how ‘the tail 
wagged the dog’—that is to say how peripheral initiatives came to dominate a system in 
place of a central motor.iii  
 
In this view, the Portuguese presence outside of the formal boundaries of the Estado da Índia 
represented nothing else than the weak fringes of empire or the ‘shadow empire’ to use one 
historians terminology.iv 
While attempts to see how the periphery influenced the broader Estado da Índia can be 
fruitful in some ways, in other contexts, such as that considered in the present paper, this view 
can be misleading. This is in keeping with the unique position of the Iberians in sixteenth-
century Southeast Asia that is substantially different from the experiences of any other European 
force to enter Asian waters. Unlike the Dutch, French, and British companies and later empires 
that followed the Portuguese into Asia in later centuries, the Portuguese crown did not have the 
resources nor sufficiently developed institutions in Asia (in contrast perhaps to the Americas, but 
not perhaps to Africa) to force a co-terminous existence between the Estado da Índia and the 
frontiers of the Portuguese diaspora.v As one scholar of the Portuguese in Asia has observed, 
one of the Portuguese leaders we will examine below, Filipe de Brito e Nicote, was unable to 
bring together the Portuguese and mestizos populating coastal Burma under his control and this 
was unfortunate for the wellbeing of the Estado da Índia.vi  
Certainly, De Brito would tease Goa with the possibility of gaining control of 2,500 
Portuguese and mestizos living in Burma outside of its control, a potentially substantial boost to 
its manpower resources.vii Such dreams, however, ignored the fact that most of the Portuguese 
and mestizos living in Burma, at the limits of the Portuguese diaspora, were there not because 
they were not allowed to live within the Estado da Índia, but because they chose not to. Had the 
Estado da Índia followed them into Burma, they would have pushed further on, to another port, 
island, or continent, somewhere –anywhere – else. As was the case of both the Burmese and the 
Portuguese in Burma, some people chose to live as far from the reach of the political centre as 
possible, for the freedom and opportunities the absence of central political control provided. 
Thus, rather than an informal or ‘shadow empire’ in George D. Winius’ view or ‘frontier’ of 
empire in Subrahmanyam’s, the areas of the mainland Southeast Asia populated by large 
communities of Portuguese and affiliates in the space between where the Estado da Índia stopped 
and the Portuguese diaspora reached is probably best considered independently of the Estado, on 
its own terms.viii This means not only looking at this special space from an internal perspective 
rather than from the perspectives of Goa or of Lisbon, but also removing how the Portuguese in 
this special space impacted or influenced the Estado da Índia as the primary focus of our 
attention. If we wished, this influence could be shown.ix Indeed, some scholars of the Portuguese 
empire consider the Portuguese communities in Burma only so far as the latter depended on 
Goa for help or when Goa depended upon them for access to certain markets and supplies for 
their formal possessions, but this sphere of activity tells us very little about these ‘renegade’ 
Portuguese and their interactions with indigenous societies.x This is also not to deny that this 
space was defined in part by the limits of formal empire, by central political and religious 
institutions in mainland Southeast Asia and in Goa and Lisbon. and by later historians. All of 
these interests portrayed these Portuguese in ways that masked their irrelevance to central 
designs and influences. What is most interesting is that these renegades, while seemingly erratic 
and contradictory in behaviour when all sources are brought together, on closer scrutiny are 
clearly revealed as calculating and manipulative in their representations to powerful centres. It is 
thus worthwhile to attempt to understand not only what motivated, but also what enabled, this 
Janus-like behaviour.  
Sometimes the motives for engagement between local leaders and the Estado da Índia or 
the Burmese court, to take one example, were political in nature and often, in accordance with 
Subrahmanyam’s understanding, the energy for engagement emerged not in the centre but in 
what he views as the frontier of the Estado da Índia or what others might view as the frontiers of 
the Burmese state. These episodes of connectivity between political centre and periphery are 
documented elsewhere and represent attempts by local leaders to reach out to the Estado da Índia 
for resources to fix temporary competitions with other local leaders rather than any effort to 
establish fixed co-terminosity. Indeed, throughout the entire period of Portuguese adventurism 
in Western and Lower Burma, local Portuguese sought generally to keep the Estado da Índia at 
arm’s length except on those few occasions when there was some commercial benefit to be had, 
and often such efforts did not reach fruition. Local Southeast Asians were even less interested in 
connections with indigenous political centres, at least not with those that eventually arrived to 
force them, temporarily at least, into subjection.  
 
RELIGION ON THE FRONTIERS 
Even without the Portuguese presence, it was on the frontiers of Southeast Asian societies and 
states that court-defined religious orthodoxies and cults had their weakest grasp making possible 
the potential for change. The indigenous state during this period had weak means of monitoring 
local areas: while it could muster forces to dominate and watch an area closely, it could only do 
so for limited periods of time, and certainly the geographic space within which it could assert this 
temporary presence was limited. Generally, aside from dispatching monks from the centre who 
may or may not have been able to exert influence locally, or donating local pagodas or 
monasteries, the court yielded to local patronage.  
Framing priestly or monastic activity within the context of formal church structures tied 
to Lisbon and Goa, on the one hand, or Buddhist royal capitals, on the other, has also helped to 
make the political centre look more powerful on the periphery and more relevant on the frontier 
than it actually was. The autonomous role played by Buddhist monks on the frontiers of the 
early modern Burmese state is paralleled by the surprising degree of autonomy and influence 
exercised by individual Catholic priests among the Portuguese settlements in Arakan and Burma. 
Rather than unusual, this was often the nature of the Catholic mission in Asia in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. Catholic priests were not limited to the formal domains of one or the 
other of the Iberian courts. Priests went wherever Portuguese communities took hold, regardless 
of their affiliations with the Estado da Índia. Further, some Catholic priests were not limited to 
either of these domains. In a Portuguese overseas world rapidly being overfilled with priests their 
monasteries tolling heavily on the resources of local communities, there was good reason for 
new priestly arrivals to organise flocks in new lands; hence, the great mobility of Catholic priests 
in Asia during the early modern period.xi Certainly, those priests who moved beyond the Estado 
da Índia and the Portuguese diasporic frontier did so at great peril and usually without much 
success. On this frontier, fortunate Catholic priests found flocks but little material support, with 
important exceptions. Portuguese renegades or freebooters, or, from the establishment of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan, refugee Japanese Christians found Catholic priests a useful means 
to confess their sins, to meet other personal spiritual needs, and to conduct important Catholic 
rituals that would gain them success in battle and in peace. Even so, most were not wealthy 
enough to provide substantial patronage. 
Some of the Portuguese who bridged the two worlds of the Estado da Índia and the 
Portuguese diasporic rimlands were enabled to seek priests out through formal channels. Indeed, 
at the beginning of the seventeenth century, some prominent members of the Portuguese 
community at Dianga, the Portuguese enclave near Chittagong, had written to the Dominican 
Vicar General in Lisbon for priests.xii In his first three years at Syriam, as well, the soon-to-be 
ruler Felipe de Brito himself summoned no Catholic priests until after he had secured formal aid 
from Goa, in 1603, and stopped at Cochin on his way back to Syriam. There the Father 
Provincial agreed to write to the four priests in Bengal, directing them to send two of their 
number to go to Syriam, where the latter arrived in February 1604.xiii They were given a residence 
and a small church and then set about their duties.xiv However, much of the movement of 
religious clergy was around the diasporic frontier, out of the direct sight of both the Estado da 
Índia and the Buddhist royal courts, but not always. It is true that such priests (or Buddhist 
monks) could represent one link of empire, providing ‘eyes and ears to the crown’,xv but not 
necessarily so and to no certain degree. From the perspective of the Portuguese in Burma at 
least, this was not the purpose or relevance of the priests.  
Following the stationing of these priests can be dizzying. In 1598, the Jesuit fathers 
Francisco Fernandes and João André Boves were dispatched to Dianga. In 1599, these priests 
decided amongst themselves that Father Fernandes should remain at Dianga, while Father André 
would go to Pegu. And the priests were free to make on the spot decisions about the viability of 
new missions. Once reaching Burma, for example, Father André remained in the port at Syriam 
for what seems to have been only a few months.xvi Other priestly movements were more 
anonymous and priests came and went without dispatch or invitation as in the case of the 
Dominican friar Belchior da Luz, who, according to De Brito, was a near relative of his who 
sought him out in Syriam once he had established himself there, a timely replacement for Father 
André.xvii Among the Jesuits, a series of often paired priests were present at Syriam in the years 
that followed, including the Jesuit Balthasar Sequeira (1606), while Burmese sources mention two 
other priests after this time who cannot be clearly identified and known only crudely as 
‘Kumuzayu Antony’ and ‘Aragatu’.xviii By 1607, priests were circulating in tours between Syriam 
and Sundiva Island (today, Sandwip Island), which, under Sebastião Gonsalves y Tibão, had 
become the new base for the Portuguese outside of Chittagong after the loss of Dianga. Among 
the Jesuits, in 1610, João Maria Griego and Blasius Nuñez served on Sundiva Island, while 
Manoel Pires and Manoel da Fonseca served at Syriam. In 1611, Pires and Diogo Nunes served 
at Sundiva, while Griego and Fonseca served at Syriam. In 1613, when Syriam was lost to the 
Burmese, Fonseca and Nunes were serving there, as were Franciscans, Dominicans, and secular 
priests. The Dominican priest Father Manoel Ferreyra was speared to death when the town was 
taken and Fonseca, Nunes, and the Dominican Father Gonçalo (known as O Granço) were all 
deported to upper Burma along with the other prisoners when the town fell. Nunes himself 
never made it to the Lower Chindwin, for he died on the march north.xix 
The circulation of these priests was neither dependent on the Estado da Índia nor random. 
Catholic priests circulated among clear and definite nodes (Dianga, Syriam, and Sundiva Island) 
in a special space that was, again, outside of the Estado da Índia but encompassed the Portuguese 
diasporic frontier in this area of Asia. More specifically, the different orders were competing with 
each other to establish themselves in the different nodes.xx As the Jesuit Father Nicholau 
Pimenta had written with some anxiety while at Syriam in 1602: ‘I understand that Philip de 
Brito will call Religious of other orders, if we decline this Mission’.xxi Nevertheless, even while 
Pimenta was there and as he himself notes, in addition to the Jesuits, the Capuchin friars had 
already established a presence outside of the town walls.xxii Hence, lists of priests in these towns 
are incomplete by themselves, for they only focus on the activities of monks from particular 
orders. 
The Catholic priests at Dianga, Syriam, and Sundiva saw their main responsibilities not in 
conversion but in preaching to existing Christians, mainly Portuguese. This does not negate their 
importance to community formation, for they performed important functions that helped local 
communities integrate on the basis of religious fraternity to a degree that could probably not 
have been achieved through any other means. At Syriam in 1599, Father André administered the 
sacraments and took confessions from Portuguese there and some of his activities drew the 
curiosity and not, importantly, the consternation of the Buddhist rulers present there. During 
Holy Week, for example, he made a sepulchre which the Arakanese king and his son came to 
observe.xxiii The Dominican priests who came to serve Chittagong in 1601 had come to 
administer the sacraments and to teach and instruct members of the Portuguese community.xxiv 
Similarly, the two priests who arrived at Syriam in February 1604 generally preached to and heard 
confession mainly from Portuguese soldiers and merchants.xxv  
The services of these priests became crucial not only to the daily life of Portuguese 
communities in Burma but also to their perceived performance in battle. Of the two priests at 
Syriam in 1605-1607, one, Pires, was stationed at the church where he conducted teaching, 
preaching, and hearing confessions to the population within the walls of the fortress, while the 
other was nearly always embarked with the fleet for battle service. The latter priest, Father Natal 
Salerno was said to have been present during all of the fighting in order to hear confessions, but 
also to pray for success in battle and victories appear to have been credited to him. This activity 
led to his own death in battle in 1607. Afterwards, Pires went with the fleet, which refused to 
move without a priest and another Jesuit, Father João Maria, took the former’s place in the 
church.xxvi  
 
BURMESE ROYAL PATRONAGE ON THE PERIPHERY 
Confusion is likely when one considers central patronage by indigenous courts of the churches 
or priests of local Portuguese communities. Buddhist courts had incentives to tolerate and even 
fund such Catholic activities as one means of assuring some form of political control or 
allegiance. Portuguese enclaves, such as that at Dianga, manipulated their distance from the 
Estado da Índia and their membership in the Portuguese diaspora to cause endless trouble for 
local rulers. Because of their maritime trade connections and especially their command of 
firearms and skill in using them, they were too dangerous a force to ignore on the outer limits of 
the royal domain. But their access to and facility with firearms also made it difficult for 
indigenous kings to exert much authority over these frontier communities. By patronizing priests 
established in these communities, they could indirectly establish influence. They did so by paying 
for the construction of churches and supporting the priests with their own purse, so that these 
priests were symbolically under royal authority but also in practice, these priests had an incentive 
to use their own influence over the community to prevent alienation from the royal court. The 
best example is the simultaneous sponsorship by the Arakanese king of both the Catholic church 
at Dianga and the Buddhist monastic order in the royal city. The 1599 meeting between Fathers 
Fonseca and Fernandes with the Arakanese king, for example, had been significant. Before the 
end of their meeting, the king explained to them that he wanted Catholic priests in residence 
both at Dianga and at his capital at Mrauk-U. He would also provide them with money to 
support and maintain them and that this money would increase the following year.xxvii Other 
examples are of the tolerance shown to Catholic communities in the Lower Chindwin from the 
second decade of the seventeenth century. There are fewer examples, or at least less evidence, of 
the patronage of local Buddhist monastics during this period, which provides an interesting 
contrast.  
On the basis of anecdotal evidence, there appears to have been some pacifying effect on 
the volatile communities of Portuguese renegades, traders, and outcastes. According to one 
source, the indigenous population ‘accustomed not to see nor to hear among [the Portuguese] 
anything but fighting, grunting, and ferocity, were enchanted with these seizures of humanity and 
gentleness’.xxviii The presence of a religious clergy that could exercise such an influence over such 
a community would thus be welcomed so long as there was little attempt to challenge indigenous 
adherence to Buddhism or the respect of lay Buddhists for the religious authority of Buddhist 
monastics. Moreover, accepting royal patronage meant recognition that the king remained the 
main patron in the kingdom and Buddhist Arakanese kings had, after all, built Muslim mosques 
for similar reasons. As Father Sebastião Manrique observed when he accepted patronage from 
the Arakanese king decades later, ‘Because all those naciones believe that the Christians of these 
parts esteem very much the Religiosos and Padres, when the king saw that I had placed myself in 
his power, he was completely self-assured’.xxix 
What the Buddhist ruler gave, he could easily take away, but despite the portrayal of 
religious persecution in Western documents, such moves were deeply political. In the case of the 
Portuguese community at Dianga, which soon expanded to include Sundiva Island outside the 
port, for example, its expansion only lasted until March 1603, when a different Portuguese 
community at Syriam rebelled against the Arakanese. The Arakanese court retaliated by 
plundering the Portuguese settlements at Dianga and elsewhere and seized control of Sundiva 
Island. During this attack, people were killed, churches were burned, and the Jesuit fathers 
André Boves and Fernandes were imprisoned; the latter died shortly after his ordeal.xxx This, 
however, was not a general assault on Catholics, priests, or even Portuguese generally, only those 
in a particular community who seem to have been selected as an example for some unrecorded 
connection with De Brito. This is clear for the Arakanese king did eventually turn on Christians 
elsewhere in his kingdom two years later, seizing five thousand Christians as well as three priests, 
and reportedly desecratating their crucifix.xxxi However, as soon as the difficult political matters 
had been resolved, the Arakanese king returned to employing many of the same Portuguese he 
had abused and resumed his patronage of the very church at Dianga he had so recently 
desecrated. Indeed, shortly after the attack, the Arakanese king made it a condition of peace with 
the Portuguese there that they should keep Catholic priests in Arakan and then set about 
building for the Dominican priests there a new church and residence, all completed quickly, by 
the middle of 1603. The reason for the Arakanese king’s peculiar generosity to the church was 
that he believed that ‘peace with the Portuguese would never be stable unless they had priests 
with them’.xxxii Politics and not religion, then, motivated the Arakanese court’s interventions 
among the Portuguese on the periphery of the kingdom.  
 
FILIPE DE BRITO AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE PERIPHERY 
A better example of the confusion over politics and religion in local community formation is 
provided by the trials and tribulations of De Brito and his followers at Syriam in Lower Burma. 
Old chroniclers and modern historians alike have considered the failed Portuguese enclave at 
Syriam, in Lower Burma, from 1599-1613 as a key example of a cultural and religious barrier, 
either representing the impermeability of indigenous mainland Southeast Asian society or the 
failings of a poorly conceived Portuguese imperial project. An early generation of Iberian 
chroniclers, represented by such men as Manuel de Fariah y Sousa, focused on moral decline and 
poor leadership as the reasons for the retraction and eclipse of the Estado da Índia after decades 
of seemingly huge unrealised opportunities, and this line of thinking was reflected in older and 
‘naïve’ secondary literature on the history of the Estado da Índia.xxxiii Amongst the examples of 
unfortunate Portuguese projects were the activities of De Brito, mentioned above. De Brito had 
been employed as a member of the Arakanese royal bodyguard in the late sixteenth century. 
When the Arakanese moved against Pegu, the royal seat of the crumbling First Toungoo 
Empire, in 1599, they placed De Brito and a Portuguese contingent, as well as a Muslim 
contingent, to stand guard at Syriam, overlooking the Rangoon River and a major passage to the 
sea. Since control of Syriam afforded control over rich Burmese maritime trade, the commercial 
prospects were huge and the Portuguese at Syriam abandoned the Arakanese court, overthrew 
the Muslim garrison, and established control over the strategic port-town.xxxiv  
De Brito is responsible for some of the confusion about whether or not Syriam belonged 
within the Estado da Índia. It resulted from his efforts to resolve a personal rivalry and an early 
leadership contest between Salvador Ribeyro and De Brito, reflected in different accounts that 
support the claims of one or the other men. Ribeyro the Spaniard, if we trust the account of his 
biographer Manuel de Abreu Mousinho, shored up the Portuguese position at Syriam from 
1602-1603 without the help of either De Brito (he was away in Goa) or the Estado da Índia.xxxv De 
Brito, however, won because he reached out to Goa and was able to negotiate material and 
manpower support from the viceroyalty, as well as the promise of further aid through his 
marriage to Dona Luiza de Saldanha, the niece of the Viceroy of Goa, and his being awarded the 
habito de Christo (making him a Knight of the Order of Christ, a very high honour).xxxvi Compared 
to Ribeyro’s few and weary men, De Brito’s ships and men brought from Goa easily allowed him 
to assert control, legitimated by the backing of the Portuguese viceroy, although the latter by 
itself probably would have meant very little. De Brito would attempt to force passing Portuguese 
and other shipping to come to Syriam and pay a duty.xxxvii This plan, despite approval from the 
Portuguese crown, yielded little fruit and orders for all passing Portuguese shipping to stop at 
Syriam and pay De Brito did not arrive before De Brito had already been killed.xxxviii Indeed, De 
Brito’s relationship with Goa had little influence in the long term on the fortunes of his port-city 
other than to secure his personal control over a rival at a key moment. Afterwards, the Estado da 
Índia’s help was not as important and De Brito seems not to have sought their involvement in 
Syriam’s affairs aside from circulating a few ‘feelers’ for large-scale support for a campaign 
against the interior of Burma. While in Goa in 1603, for example, De Brito wrote a report 
detailing how with control of Syriam, the Portuguese crown would gain control of Burma as 
well.xxxix De Brito is remembered most, however, not for his relationship to the Estado da Índia, 
but for his zeal in developing his personal fortune at local expense. De Brito would come to 
influence or control outright large parts of the Irrawaddy delta over the years that followed, 
buttressed by marriage and other kinds of alliances with indigenous rulers of important towns 
upriver and on the coast.  
One might have expected, given the way in which De Brito portrayed himself to the 
Estado da Índia when he needed its help, that encouraging large-scale conversion efforts would 
have been a sensible thing for him to do, in order to obtain assistance from Goa in the future. 
Moreover, Lower Burma would seem to have been an ideal place to engage in such an effort. 
For the past half century and more, Pegu, just upriver from Syriam, had been the core of the 
Burmese kingdom. But the kingdom had begun to unravel from the early 1590s until it finally 
collapsed in 1599. Because of war and economic collapse, perhaps hundreds of thousands from 
the region had sought refuge elsewhere, in particular amongst the new political centres that 
broke away from Pegu as it weakened. Peguan patronage of Buddhism and the monastic order 
had also collapsed. In other words, a political centre had taken on the character of what might 
normally be considered a periphery. Added to this the doubt and uncertainty that follows the 
collapse of a political, social, and religious order and one might have expected greater receptivity 
to a new faith championed by a new and, at least at the time, apparently more successful and 
promising order. 
Nevertheless, references to conversion, at least in the early years of Portuguese Syriam, 
are brief and relatively un-detailed. Portuguese accounts claim that when the Arakanese king had 
originally stationed the Portuguese at Syriam in 1599, they were mandated not only to garrison 
the spot, but also to gather and protect indigenous refugees from the wars who might return, or, 
in other words, to foster the growth of a lively and populous port-town. By October 1602, De 
Brito had organised the construction of settlements for these people, some fourteen to fifteen 
thousand in total, who engaged in cultivation around the city and all of whom, we are told by 
Catholic sources, were disposed to be baptised.xl Certainly, the Jesuit Fernão Guerreiro argued 
that the main purpose of the Portuguese fortresses in the region, and hopefully of Syriam as well, 
was to give shelter to local populations who could then be converted to Christianity.xli Pimenta 
observed in a lengthy letter written at Syriam in 1602 that Lower Burma was ripe for conversion, 
that Buddhist monks had admitted that they were merely waiting for someone to teach them a 
better religion, and that these monks also came to Christian churches to venerate the images of 
the Saints and the crucifix.xlii 
Despite the optimism of Pimenta and Guerreiro, reality proved very different. 
Missionaries found it difficult to find converts among the indigenous population in either 
Arakan or Lower Burma. When Father André arrived at Syriam in 1599, he bemoaned the fact 
that it was not possible to introduce Christianity here, for the recent wars had left the land a 
wasteland, devoid of inhabitants.xliii The father thus abandoned hope and Syriam for Dianga.xliv 
De Brito himself wrote to Pimenta in 1601 that although priests would presumably be welcomed 
by the Portuguese among his followers, there was little hope so long as warfare prevailed of 
spreading Christianity: ‘as the country is still disturbed, it holds out no promise; but we hope 
with the help of God that, when it is pacified, it will yield some good fruit’.xlv The two priests 
who arrived in February 1604 were also to preach to indigenous Christians. Moreover, they were 
said to have sought converts, but no indication is given as to how or how vigorously this was 
done. By 1605–6, however, even Guerreiro admitted that in actuality little evangelistic effort was 
being directed toward the indigenous population, not because of a lack of interest on the latter’s 
part, but because they were reportedly too disturbed by warfare and that the priests were waiting 
for a period of tranquillity for this work to commence. In most cases, the few baptisms that took 
place occurred among sick children in the vicinity of the Portuguese settlements.xlvi 
During the entire period from De Brito’s installation at Syriam until the end of his wars 
with Arakan in 1607, the failure to convert large numbers of Peguans to Christianity seems to 
have had little impact on De Brito’s willingness or ability to recruit soldiers from among the local 
population. Although their role is not stressed in the Portuguese accounts, occasional references 
indicate that the Portuguese soldiers at Syriam and in the various expeditions dispatched by De 
Brito were vastly outnumbered by Peguans who might include some Christian converts but who 
were probably mostly Buddhists.xlvii Without conversion to Christianity, at least until after 1607 
as will be discussed further below, it is unclear by what means a community of tens of thousands 
of Buddhist Peguans and scores to hundreds of Portuguese cooperated under De Brito’s 
leadership in years of warfare against the Arakanese. Most of the sources for the period refer to 
Peguans amongst Portuguese forces at Syriam, but shed little light on how the little port polity 
functioned internally. Given later developments as well as De Brito’s correspondence with the 
institutions of the Estado da , however, it is fairly certain that the ‘glue’ that kept this community 
together was not Christianity.    
If we were to accept the version of De Brito presented in the Portuguese or Burmese 
literature alike, why he did not simply attempt to convert the local population to Christianity 
from the beginning of his revolt against the Arakanese becomes an interesting but difficult 
question to answer. As with the Arakanese king’s approach to the Portuguese community at 
Dianga, it seems that De Brito’s hand was often guided by political necessity. Again, De Brito 
had stated all along that he did not think conversion was wise until he had secured his position at 
Syriam. This could have been because he would need to recruit locally for manpower to 
supplement his ship crews, build his fortress walls, and garrison his positions. If he should 
engage in forcible conversion before he had finally beaten off the Arakanese, he might be dealing 
a fatal and self-inflicted blow. Or, he may simply have played lip service to plans for local 
conversion and had no long-term plans to follow through with his promises to the church or to 
the crown. This may have changed, however, when his attention was turned, after many years, 
from the need to defend his position and to a more exclusive concern with enriching himself 
from the local landscape, especially after plans to force Portuguese shipping to stop at Syriam 
and pay for a permit did not reach expectations. 
From late 1607, De Brito seems to have felt secure enough to energetically pursue what 
appears only on the surface to have been service to the cross. De Brito now began to raid local 
pagodas to steal wealth donated to Buddhism and to melt down Buddhist temple bells to cast 
cannon. There is ample corroboration for De Brito’s raiding temples for their bells to melt down 
for cannon, beginning in 1608 with that closest to him—the Shwe Dagon Pagoda across the 
river-- which had a bell that was at that time and remains today, the largest bell in the world. 
Since this bell would have been the obviously the biggest prize in terms of metal and because it 
was so close to De Brito’s fortress, it seems likely that De Brito’s seizure of this bell marked the 
beginning of De Brito’s temple desecration. In this case, De Brito used elephants to pull the 
gigantic bell donated by King Dhammazedi to the Shwe Dagon Pagoda down to the river, 
loaded it onto a raft, and then lost it to the muddy depths when the raft broke near Monkey 
Point near modern Rangoon; attempts to recover the gargantuan copper bell continue to the 
present day.xlviii Burmese sources also hold that De Brito sought to extract other resources from 
the temples as well. Gold and silver enshrined in the cetis and iron finials as well as bronze drums 
were all removed to be resold overseas.xlix  
While religious wealth was stolen, there does not appear to be any evidence of the 
wholesale destruction of more poorly endowed religious buildings, despite a vague assertion by 
U Tin in the 1930s that De Brito destroyed all Buddhist structures in Lower Burma.l There is no 
evidence of anything quite so extreme, but it is true that early during De Brito’s presence at 
Syriam, abandoned temples and monasteries were occupied by Catholic priests and turned into 
churches, hospitals, and colleges. For example, during this period a Buddhist monastery at 
Syriam was made into a church for the secular clergy (under the Bishop of Cochin) and a 
Buddhist pagoda was assigned to the Jesuits and renamed St Paul’s Church. But there is little 
evidence of Buddhist monasteries being destroyed at any point.li  
Burmese royal sources attempt to portray the Portuguese at Syriam at this time as 
engaging in what amounted to massive forced conversion and the destruction of Peguan 
religious culture. De Brito is said to have ordered that donations were no longer to be made to 
Buddhist monks, such monks were thus forced to flee the region, and only Catholics were 
allowed to remain within the walls of his city. Both Peguan and Burman monks who remained 
accepted conversion and took to drinking alcohol and wearing woollen hats and other 
accoutrements of Christian priestly wear.lii According to the Mehti Hsaya-daw, a Burmese monk 
writing in the 1790s, the introduction of the practice of religious men wearing hats came under 
the rule of De Brito, whom the Burmese refer to as Nga Zinga, at Syriam (in Burma, Thanlyn). 
Unfortunately, the Mehti Hsaya-daw is not more detailed than this and it is unclear what the 
dynamics were at work here. For example, the monastic historian could mean that De Brito’s 
rule disrupted normal Buddhist courtly management of the religion and hence some irregularities 
slipped in amongst Buddhist monks. Certainly, he also asserts that unorthodox practices 
regarding the wearing of monastic robes were also introduced during this period because, it is 
implied, no one forced a resolution of monastic differences.liii Taken as a whole, these activities 
were said to have driven those Buddhists who remained underground. Some conversion, 
however must have taken place, for although the Portuguese had numbered about one hundred 
when Syriam was besieged in 1613, before the fighting and the reported slaughter of many 
Portuguese had occurred, Fonseca, taken prisoner with the rest, reported in his letter of 29 
December 1616 that there were five thousand Christians amongst their imprisoned number. One 
can only assume that most of these were Peguan Christians, perhaps with groups of Indian 
converts.liv 
The testimony of the Burmese accounts, however, is suspect. Rather than local sources, 
these accounts draw solely upon the archives of the royal centre at a time when Burmese armies 
came south and defeated De Brito. Political and economic reasons certainly must have weighed 
heavily in the Burmese expansion to the south and De Brito was probably seen more as a threat 
to Burmese material and political wellbeing than as a threat to Buddhism in the kingdom. Both 
the sacrilege against Buddhist pagodas and the reportedly forced nature of religious conversion 
in the episode are used as examples of the misguided policies that brought the enclave's collapse. 
As a result, we are told, of his insults to Buddhism, De Brito’s fortress was besieged by angry 
Burmans, he was taken alive, and impaled on an iron stake. Hanging from this, he bled to death 
three days later. The image of a ‘skewered’ De Brito was also a symbol in the Burmese narratives 
of what happened to those who challenged the prevailing indigenous system of beliefs. In a 
similar way, one late eighteenth-century Burmese chronicler, associated residual Catholic 
influences after the fall of Syriam with the subsequent impurity of Buddhism in southern Burma 
and hence the need for northern Buddhists to purify it.lv Buddhist accounts thus misinterpreted 
what was in fact the assertion of political authority as the assertion of central religion, masking a 
political motivation as a religious one.. 
A more nuanced interpretation of what underscored the Burmese siege and capture of 
Syriam in 1613 is supported by the treatment of the Portuguese captives, which was very similar 
to the Arakanese king’s treatment of the community at Dianga after 1603. The Buddhist royal 
court wanted to keep the newly captured Portuguese in a contained community as a resource 
under its control. The survivors of De Brito’s men, Portuguese of various origins, were dragged 
off to lands deep in the interior, where they became hereditary artillerymen in the Burmese royal 
army. Strangely, despite the religious tone of the historical accounts of the episode, from both 
the Portuguese and Burmese sides, the Portuguese deportees were allowed to freely practice their 
faith, openly ministered by Portuguese Catholic priests. Although Nunes had died on the way up 
to Upper Burma, the community still had the services of the Gonçalo and Fonseca, again, a 
Dominican and a Jesuit respectively. Moreover, over the years, they were allowed to receive new 
priests dispatched by their respective orders.lvi The Portuguese taken at Syriam thus appear to 
have been returned to a situation akin to that of the Portuguese at Dianga. The Buddhist court 
thus allowed them a Catholic priest and provided patronage, and the community was maintained 
in a subordinate and felicitous relation with the indigenous court.  
 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to determine which of the many obstacles to understanding cultural and religious 
change outside of the political centre is the most problematic in dealing with sixteenth century 
Southeast Asia. Perhaps the most serious is the straightforwardness of accounts in centrally-
controlled paper archives. These seem to have ready-made easily digestible answers for all of our 
potential questions regarding why Catholic priests were in Burma at the time, how much a part 
Portuguese communities there were of the Estado da Índia, and why De Brito fell. Such sources 
blind us to the need to question the paradigm of conquest and conversion, from the Portuguese 
side, or desecration and punishment, from the Burmese accounts. Nevertheless, despite the 
paucity of local sources, local realities always leave their imprint on the written records if they are 
examined closely enough and with a commitment on the part of the researcher to different kinds 
of questions. But it also requires looking outside of the parameters, political, religious, and 
economic, established by the scholarship of one’s own time. If one wants to understand the 
Portuguese in Burma within the framework of the Estado da Índia, it is fairly easy to do so, if one 
holds that the Estado’s boundaries moved wherever members of the Portuguese diaspora went. 
Local activity during the period, however, suggests otherwise, affiliations with the Estado da Índia 
being temporary invitations made by men who were in search of help to resolve immediate 
political and economic crises. As I have attempted to show in this paper, religious conversion or 
patronage, by both the Portuguese leadership and the Buddhist courts, was often heavily guided 
by considerations political and economic. 
 While political leadership often enabled and disrupted local community formation, 
through religious fraternity or otherwise, it did not change local realities. Religious influence in 
the overlap of the frontiers of Buddhist kingdoms and the Portuguese diaspora more properly 
rested with individual Catholic priests, as it did in other areas of Burma with Buddhist monks, 
with the cooperation of local interests, to fashion a flock. These priests played an important role 
in pulling together renegade Portuguese communities through preaching, hearing confession, 
and conducting religious rituals. It may seem unusual that priests who wrote enthusiastic letters 
back to their superiors about the lucrative prospects for evangelisation proved to be rather 
unenthusiastic about actually initiating mass conversions of indigenous populations. Perhaps that 
phenomenon can be best attributed to local expediency and the place of agents of religious and 
cultural change in these areas where the Portuguese diaspora and Burma’s frontiers overlapped. 
In this zone, improvisation and cooperation, between priest and renegade was an essential part 
of making local communities work. 
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